INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM
CHARLES W. COLLIERt

A "mature" science, according to Thomas Kuhn, can afford to
be uncritical.1 It has finally answered to its practitioners' satisfaction the fundamental, foundational questions of their field. It finally rests ("for a time,"2 at least) on an established scientific
achievement that epitomizes the accomplished, collective wisdom
of an age and defines the terms, conditions, directions, and limits
of further refining research. With this "paradigm"3 in place, researchers are spared the incessant and distracting reexamination of
first principles, the extravagant costs of intellectual retooling; they
can proceed with confidence, effectiveness, and efficiency to do
what they do best: articulating and specifying the received paradigm in more depth and detail, extending and applying it to new
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1. See Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, in CRrTICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 1, 6 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds.,

1970) (arguing that "it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the
transition to a science").
2.

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed.

1970).
3. On the term "paradigm," see Kuhn, supra note 1, at 16-19; Thomas S. Kuhn,
Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note

1, at 231, 271-72; Thomas S. Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 459 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977); Margaret Masterman,
The Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note

1, at 59, 61-66 (discussing Kuhn's twenty-one senses of "paradigm"); cf. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. 3, 34 n.108
(1984) ("[N]ormal science establishes a paradigm of rules governing questions that are
interesting, evidence that would answer those questions, and answers that are acceptable.").
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areas of interest. Because a paradigm "provides rules that tell the

practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his
science are like," the practitioner "can concentrate with assurance
upon the esoteric problems that these rules and existing knowl-

edge define for him."'
Postmodern legal theory appropriates and assimilates Kuhn's

insights in ways and to an extent that have not, I think, yet been
fully recognized.' In describing the development of legal scholar-

ship in Kuhnian terms, I am thus merely elaborating assumptions
integral to contemporary intellectual discourse.6 In particular, in-

4. KUHN, supra note 2, at 42; see also id. at 24 ("[R]estrictions, born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be essential to the development of science. By focusing
attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists
to investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable."); cf. id. at 163-64:
[O]nce the reception of a common paradigm has freed the scientific community
from the need constantly to re-examine its first principles, the members of that
community can concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most esoteric of
the phenomena that concern it. Inevitably, that does increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency with which the group as a whole solves new problems.
5. See eg., Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and
History, 41 HASTINGS .J. 537 (1990); Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority:
A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 771; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Stanley Fish, Fish
v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L REV. 739 (1982); Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1203 (1985); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the
Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 199 (1984); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarly Paradigms: A New Tradition Based on
Context and Color, 16 VT. L. REV. 913 (1992); Robert J. Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification and Truth in Constitutional Theory, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1992); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Morality and Law in Interaction, 37 FLA. L. REV. 297
(1985); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MicH. L.
REV. 1835 (1988); Girardeau A. Spann, Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1987); John
Stick, Literary Imperialism: Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in Law's
Empire, 34 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1986) (book review); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature
of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L
REV. 1 (1989); G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L
REV. 649 (1984); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1443 (1990).
6. See, eg., STANLEY FISH, Rhetoric, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACrICE OF THEORY IN Lr'ERARY AND LEGAL STUD-

IES 471, 486 (1989) ("The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is arguably the most frequently cited work in the humanities and social sciences in the past twenty-five years,
and it is rhetorical through and through."); Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism
and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (1990) ("[W]e have all read
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terdisciplinary legal scholarship regularly proceeds on the assumption that it possesses a stable, accepted, and uncontroversial paradigm for further research-in other words, that it constitutes a
"mature science." But beneath the institutional trappings of interdisciplinary legal scholarship I detect not a scholarly tradition that
has finally resolved to general acclaim all its basic, foundational,
methodological problems, but rather one that has never really
confronted them.7 As a result, the attempt to apply the supposed
paradigm of interdisciplinary legal scholarship to its subject matter
reveals significant "anomalies" in the application. In what follows I
shall first analyze and discuss these anomalies and then consider in

some detail a specific example of contemporary interdisciplinary
legal scholarship!
I. THE Loss OF A PARADIGM
There was a time when legal scholarship indeed possessed a
stable, mature paradigm. The research it guided, the "normal

science" of late-nineteenth-century legal scholarship, was patterned
on the work of the common law judge.9 It was "judicious," in the
Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin, and Feyerabend, and have thereby become suspicious of the
term 'scientific method.' "); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100
YALE /...1515, 1539 n.93 (1991) ("The canned footnote here typically begins with T.
KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENIrFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970), and continues according to
the author's taste and reading."); G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical
Standards, 60 TFX L REV. 569, 569 (1982) (depicting "the growing momentum in contemporary academic life of Kuhnian logic"); cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986) (arguing that "paradigm-shifting" legal theories,
which are generally praised, should be abandoned in favor of "the more pedestrian activity of 'normal science' ").
7. Cf. Masterman, supra note 3, at 75 (discussing the case "where 'normal science'
prematurely sets in in some unjustified manner, by a set of fashion-following scientists
starting to imitate one another without proper pre-examination of the paradigm (i.e.
without the alleged insight that a certain paradigm is relevant to a particular field being
a genuine insight)").
8. In a forthcoming work tentatively entitled "The Intellectual Origins of Tolerance
and Freedom of Expression," I shall reexamine in detail the applicability of Kuhn's theory to fields such as law. For now, compare Steven L Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses
of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 670 n.162 (1990) ("My own sense is that the legal
community, especially the legal academy, bears significant parallels to the scientific community as Kuhn describes it.") with Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.. 949, 964 n.39 (1988) ("Even if the controversy
about scientific objectivity is resolved in the manner most favorable to [Kuhn], ... it is
a mistake to burden law with conclusions drawn from the scientist's external-and therefore less secure-mode of cognition.").
9. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reex-
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sense of being balanced, moderate, temperate, and pragmatic; it

was largely descriptive, respectful of previous authority, and faithful to existing law; it recommended only modest improvements in
the law. "[T]he proposal of some well-crafted incremental change
in the law.., is the hallmark of the excellent judge."' The
"paradigm" guiding this type of research was something like the

following: "(1) state the problem; (2) propose a solution; (3) show
how the common law, properly reinterpreted, affords the proposed

solution."" Scholarship based on this paradigm, like the scholarship in a mature natural science, consisted mainly of brief articles

devoted to doctrinal problem-solving-modest, incremental refinements of a shared, cumulative enterprise: "the common law."' 2
The various Restatement projects of the early twentieth century

proceeded smoothly under this paradigm as "highly cumulative
enterprise[s], eminently successful in [their] aim, the steady extension of the scope and precision of scientific knowledge."' 3

amining the Assumptions of InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L. 191, 195-96
(1991); cf. KUHN, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that a paradigm, "like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law[,] ... is an object for further articulation and specification
under new or more stringent conditions").
10. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2439, 2442 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings] (testimony of George L. Priest); cf.
G. EDWARD WHrrE, TORT LAW IN AMERCA: AN INTELLECTUAL HIsToRY 211-12
(1980) (noting that even up until the 1950s, "[c]ase analysis was the nub of an article:
the scholar appeared as the balanced voice of reason").
11. Collier, supra note 9, at 199-200.
12. See id.at 197-99; A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 632 (1981); J.C.
Gray, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE W. 159, 159 (1892) ("We are all here firm
believers in [the common law]. We desire that the students may be filled with its spirit."); cf. KUHN, supra note 2, at 20:
[The research reports of scientists] usually appear as brief articles addressed
only to professional colleagues .... whose knowledge of a shared paradigm can
be assumed and who prove to be the only ones able to read the papers addressed to them.
Today in the sciences, books are usually either texts or retrospective reflections upon one aspect or another of the scientific life. The scientist who
writes one is more likely to find his professional reputation impaired than enhanced. Only in the earlier, pre-paradigm, stages of the development of the
various sciences did the book ordinarily possess the same relation to professional achievement that it still retains in other creative fields. And only in those
fields that still retain the book, with or without the article, as a vehicle for research communication are the lines of professionalization still so loosely drawn
that the layman may hope to follow progress by reading the practitioners' original reports.
13.

KUHN, supra note 2, at 52; cf WILIAM L TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
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By comparison, a glance at contemporary-particularly
interdisciplinary-legal scholarship reveals a state of what might
charitably be termed "pre-revolutionary" turmoil.14 Legal scholars
today seem to be "competing much like ... seventeenth and

eighteenth century explorers seeking new discoveries: competing to
promote new theories and new ideas around which fields of law
will be reorganized,""5 and competing to write the longest, most
theoretical, and most profoundly deconstructive monographs possible. With this palpable collapse of consensus, such that nothing
can be assumed as common knowledge and taken for granted,
foundations must be relaid completely for every argument. 16 That
may explain both "the current fascination with high theory" and
the inordinate length of modem law review articles. 7 "The proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything,
the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy
and to debate over fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a
transition from normal to extraordinary research.""
Since contemporary interdisciplinary legal scholarship is manifestly not possessed of a stable, accepted, uncontroversial "paradigm," I have had to construct one for it by inference, out of the
sometimes contradictory flux of current debate and scholarly work.
This implicit paradigm makes use of the following complementary
assumptions, neither of which stands up to close scrutiny.

THE REALIST MOVEMENT 275 (1985);

The method [of the Restatements] is that of interstitial development of the
law . . . since they only attempt to change in the absence of a consensus, and
restrict themselves to choosing between alternatives that have already been
adopted somewhere ... . In short, the Restatements have been instruments of
slow evolution rather than of a reformist approach.
14. See Collier, supra note 9, at 192-93; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok- Excesses
in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L REV. 926, 928 (1990) ("The academy
has a problem.").
15. Bork Hearings, supra note 10, at 2440-41 (testimony of George L. Priest); see
also id. at 2440 ("This style of scientific research and scholarship has been tremendously
important in encouraging new ways of thought and is described familiarly in Thomas
Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. .. ").
16. Cf KUHN, supra note 2, at 19-20 ("When the individual scientist can take a
paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field
anew, starting from first principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced.").
17. See WHrrE, supra note 10, at 213-15; Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the
Peasant: Ill-Tempered, but Brief, Comments on Legal Scholarship, in PROPERTY LAW AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 183, 189 (Peter Hay & Michael Hoeflich eds., 1988).
18. KUHN, supra note 2, at 91.
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(1) Philosophy and humanistic theory can contribute to the
authority of legal scholarship and (indirectly) judicial doctrine.'

At some level this assumption is perhaps unobjectionable. There is
probably no enterprise that could not occasionally benefit from a
new and foreign theoretical perspective on its basic underlying
assumptions and conceptual structure. But the "normal science" of
legal scholarship cannot subsist on a steady diet of fundamental
reexamination any more than the mature science of adjudication
can; indeed, it is only the repression of fundamental preoccupations that allows these activities to proceed and progress at all

efficiently.' Far from "contributing to the authority" of legal
doctrine, a preoccupation with philosophy and humanistic theory
could only contribute to the undermining of the limited
and nar21
row agenda that adjudication, of necessity, pursues.

What would it mean for the authority of judicial doctrine to
derive from philosophy and humanistic theory? For one thing, it
would mean the end of the actual institution of adjudication as we
know it (which might not necessarily be a bad thing). That institution, firmly based on the doctrine of stare decisis, has never ceased
19. I intend with this formulation to include both "descriptive" and "prescriptive" (or
normative) uses of interdisciplinary theory. Some legal scholars claim only that their use
of nonlegal concepts and methods permits of a deeper, more accurate, or more telling
description of the legal landscape; others see themselves simply as making suggestions of
a nonlegal origin for the improvement and refinement of judicial decisionmaking and
legal doctrine. But I doubt that this dichotomy can or needs to be maintained, or that
these functions can so readily be separated. Often the best groundwork for a "prescription" is nothing other than an accurate "description" of the problem. And one of the
most basic (even if not always explicit) motivations for, or justifications of, legal scholarship is the improvement of the law. Se4 eg., Robert M. Hayden, Social Theory and
Legal Practice: Intuition, Discourse, and Legal Scholarship, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1989)
(noting that "the traditional goals of legal theory" are "to explain the existing law, to
justify legal principles, to critique existing doctrine, and to prescribe the directions that
law ought to take"); John F. Banzhaf III, Rank Law Schools on Quality Not Quantity,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 10 ("Since the most realistic measure of any legal
scholarship is its effect on the law, a far better ranking would be based upon how often
faculty members are cited on the winning side in court opinions.").
20. Cf. KuHN, supra note 2, at 5 ("Normal science . . . often suppresses fundamental
novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.").
21. Cf. id. at 88:
It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have
turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their
field. Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosophers. Indeed,
normal science usually holds creative philosophy at arm's length, and probably
for good reasons . . . . But that is not to say that the search for assumptions
(even for non-existent ones) cannot be an effective way to weaken the grip of
a tradition upon the mind and to suggest the basis for a new one.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:840

to value the "institutional authority" of established judicial precedent over the "intellectual authority"-however impressive-of autonomous, nonlegal argumentation.' From a purely intellectual
point of view, the very idea that prior decisions could have any
weight in the balance is, as Holmes complained, "revolting."' No
intellectual enterprise worthy of the name could tolerate such a
degree of nonintellectual interference with its proceedings and
results; nor could it countenance the ideas (propounded by distinguished jurists) that "[a] bad reason may often make good law"'
and that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."'
If we pursue this gloss of adjudication in a somewhat different
direction we see why a second implicit assumption of interdisciplinary legal scholarship cannot be right either. (2) Judicial opinions provide apt models for philosophical and humanistic theory.

This assumption, too, is objectionable only if one understands by
the resulting "theory" something more than an empirical description or summary of "what judges do., 26 The problems of plausi22. See Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 151 (1992); Collier, supra note 9, at 206-23; cf. generally Collier, supra
note 5.
23. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
And "[ilt is still more revolting if the grounds upon which [a rule of law] was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
Id.
24. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
161, 163 (1930). "For that matter," asserts Goodhart, "it is precisely some of those cases
which have been decided on incorrect premises or reasoning which have become the
most important in the law." Id; see, e.g., In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560 (1921) (assuming that
a reasonable man would not have anticipated that a plank falling into the hold of a ship
filled with petrol vapor might cause an explosion); Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868) (impliedly holding negligence of a contractor to be an immaterial fact); GEOFFREY
R. STONE FT AL, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 499-503 (2d ed. 1991) (critically examining the
assumptions and reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); id. at
929-37 (similarly examining Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). "Erroneous ideas...
have played an enormous part in shaping the law," according to another commentator,
because "[an idea, adopted by a court, is in a superior position to influence conduct and
opinion in the community, judges, after all, are rulers. And the adoption of an idea by a
court reflects the power structure in the community." EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6 (1949).
25. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938) and Helvering
v. Mountain Prods. Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). "This is commonly true," adds Justice
Brandeis, "even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can
be had by legislation." Id.
26. Cf Collier, supra note 9, at 223-24 (noting the differences between the relation-
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bility arise when theory is understood as an abstract articulation of
the basic underlying assumptions and conceptual structure of law.
Some such problems were already suggested in the above
discussion of the peculiarly "institutional" authority of the judiciary.27 From a strictly "intellectual" (that is, not necessarily legal)
point of view, can it be anything other than the wildest of coincidences if the ideas and opinions of Supreme Court Justices are of
the slightest general interest? Consider the routes and criteria by
which, in our highly politicized appointments process, such persons
are selected for their positions in the first place.' Consider then
how many competing viewpoints a majority opinion must appease
in order to become law, so that it finally resembles a "bureaucratic" or (perhaps even worse) a "committee" project.29 Consider
also that judicial opinions today are mostly not even written by
judges or Justices; they are "ghostwritten" by youthful apprentices
called law clerks (a practice that in most scholarly contexts would
seem bizarre).' Finally, consider the actual subject matter of adjudication, the relatively limited problems with which the judiciary
deals, and the exceedingly narrow way in which issues must be
framed for judicial determination. 3' Together, these considerations
function as rather severe "institutional" constraints on whatever
theoretical ambitions and capacities the judiciary may harbor.
Legal reasoning in a caselaw regime has been well described
as a process of "reasoning by example," and the judicial function
as "[t]he determination of similarity or difference."32 Our courts
have consistently-sometimes for good policy reasons-resisted the
temptation to convert themselves into forums for the debate of
theoretical legal fundamentals.33 Even at the rarefied heights of,
say, the Supreme Court, the questions a Justice faces are by nature much narrower and more mundane than those typically en-

ship of the "humanistic theory of what judges do" to "what judges do" and the relation-

ship of the philosophy of science to what scientists do).
27. See Id. at 215-23.
28. See id. at 225-28.
29. See id. at 228-29. For a broad-ranging meditation on the legal significance of
"bureaucracy," see David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy,

90 MicH. L. REV. 2348 (1992).
30. See Collier, supra note 9, at 228-32.
31. See id. at 234-36.
32.

LEvi, supra note 24, at 1-2.

33. See Collier, supra note 9, at 238-39.
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countered in philosophy and humanistic theory. Even when formulated generally, judicial doctrine is relatively more empirical and
"case-specific," relatively less the unified intellectual product'of a
creative mind. If one were seeking a model for "theory" (in any
but the weakest sense4), the actual judicial practice of even the
Supreme Court would be a decidedly (and increasingly) inauspicious place to look.' The ideas and opinions of most Supreme
Court Justices would not be of the slightest theoretical or philosophical significance, except for the fact (which from an intellectual point of view must be considered fortuitous) that they are the
ideas and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. It is only the institutional position of these officials that makes their work product
seem comparable in authority to the "primary sources" of other
disciplines.36
In summary, the "paradigm" implicitly embraced by interdisciplinary legal theory cannot consistently make use of the assumptions that "philosophy and humanistic theory can contribute to the
authority of legal scholarship and (indirectly) judicial doctrine"
and that "judicial opinions provide apt models for philosophical
and humanistic theory." Nevertheless, these considerations have
not prevented a growing number of interdisciplinary legal scholars
from basing extensive research programs on just such assumptions.
The consequences may perhaps best be illustrated by reference to
a case study, which forms the subject of the following Part.
II.

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE
BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT

Sheldon Nahmod's Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From
Constitution to Tort 7 provides an interesting and revealing example of contemporary interdisciplinary legal scholarship. An analysis
of this piece will illuminate many of the issues discussed above.

34. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
35. See Collier, supra note 9, at 239-44 (discussing the Court's use and abuse of
precedent).
36. See hi at 219-23; cf. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 787, 814 (1989) ("From a certain philosophical perspective, Holmes' pragmatist
theory of law is ... essentially banal. At its most abstract level it concludes in truisms.").
37. 77 GEo. LJ. 17i9 (1989); see also Collier, supra note 9, at 204-05 (discussing
Nahmod's article).
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The article starts off unremarkably enough with "An Overview of § 1983 Discourse."' Section 1983, it seems, contains language reminiscent of both constitutional law ("under color of
[law]" and "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution") and tort law ("subjects, or causes to be subjected" and "shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law"). 39 Previously, courts emphasized the constitutional
aspect; more recently-in nothing less than "a deliberate and strategic exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court"---the
torts aspect has been emphasized, to the distinct disadvantage of
plaintiffs. Nahmod employs various familiar metaphors to describe
this transition: what was once in the "background" has moved to
41 what was once "central" has been rendered
the "foreground,"
"marginal."'4 2 But these are merely metaphors, and Nahmod
seems unsatisfied with this sort of explanation. (Apparently, the
corresponding transition from the liberal Warren Court to the
conservative Rehnquist Court is too obvious to merit mention.4 3)
He seeks something deeper, something less obvious, something
more theoretical or "philosophical."
A stunning transformation awaits the reader who turns the
page to Nahmod's second section, entitled "Language and Discourse."' Whereas previously the article dealt exclusively with
mundane legal cases involving misplaced hobby kits, pillows left
on staircases, and the like, here it introduces subsections on Nietzsche, Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault. As Nahmod explains, these
philosophers are part of a program to "evaluate discourse at a
theoretical level." 45
One detects immediately a weighty new tone, suggestive of
immense possibilities. "Nietzsche is the originator of the idea that
38.

Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1721-31.

39.
40.
41.
42.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); cf. Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1721 n.10, 1736.
Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1720.
See iL at 1719.
See id. at 1736, 1738.

43.

Another ready explanation seems to be lurking in Nahmod's observation that

"[t]o signal its view that many § 1983 suits waste time and resources, the Court has
chosen to review § 1983 cases brought by prisoners-in particular, ostensibly trivial cases
involving lost hobby-kit materials and injuries resulting from pillows left on prison stairs."
Id.at 1744. To me this suggests that the Court can manipulate or control not so much
its "discourse" as its docket.

44. Id. at 1731-38.
45.

Id. at 1731.
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the world is aesthetically self-creating,"' begins Nahmod-and at
that level of generality, who could disagree? Given that Nietzsche
originated this idea, it Would presumably be presumptuous if not
precarious to assert the opposite: "No, the world is not aesthetically self-creating." Besides, it js hard to imagine how one would
support either proposition. In any event, such propositions are not
being argued for; they are citations to authority-in this case the
authority of Nietzsche, who is after all a European philosopher of
considerable renown. It is as though the Supreme Court asked the
parties in a case to brief the issue, "whether the world is aesthetically self-creating," and Nietzsche is listed in the petitioner's "Table of Authorities."
Nahmod's analysis of language proceeds with the following
pronouncements: "Nietzsche believed that language does not express objective reality. Language tells us little, if anything, about
things as they actually are. Words do not adequately express the
reality of the objects they purport to describe."'47 Given these
staggering deficiencies of language, one might have expected
Nahmod's article to end at this point. Instead, it continues on to a
discussion of structural linguistics, which "as formulated by
Ferdinand de Saussure, provides valuable insights into the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence."' *
The first such insight is another citation to authority:
"Saussure believes that language is a system of signs."4 9 Further
insights quickly converge on the imponderable:
Because we require language in order to think-that is, we do
not think the natural world but only its expression in languageit is these signs that frame and shape all knowledge. We see
what our language permits us to see. Something does not exist
for us unless there is a word for it. 50

46. Id.at 1731 n.80. Nahmod's support for this proposition comes from ALLAN
MEGILL, PROPHETS OF ExTREMrY: NiETZScHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA
29-33 (1985).

47. Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1732 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 1733 (emphasis added).
49. Id.at 1732 n.83. Nahmod's support for this proposition comes from TERRY
EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 96 (1983).
50. Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1733. Nahmod's support for these propositions comes
from John Sturrock, Introduction to STRUCnURALISM AND SINCE: FROM Lvxi-STRAuss
TO DERRIDA 2, 5-9 (John Sturrock ed., 1979) [hereinafter STRUCrURALISM AND SINCE].
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For those still pondering the possible relevance of such insights to
the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence, the following subsection
promises welcome relief: "Specifically relevant to my analysis of
the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence are Jacques Derrida and
Michel Foucault."'"
Derrida's relevance seems to lie in his strategy of "discover[ing] and invert[ing] the 'margins' of the text being criticized." 2
Derrida apparently pursues this strategy zealously: he "is willing to
make use of anything marginal."' 3 Once something marginal has
been located, "[h]e will then, against the author's intention, develop these margins to show the text's contradictory meanings and'
the ways in which any argument has the seeds of its opposing
argument."' 4 This sentence in Nahmod's text is followed immediately by a new paragraph, which begins: "This deconstruction of
margins helps us to understand the relative ease of the previously
described shift in emphasis from constitutional rhetoric to tort
rhetoric in the Supreme Court's § 1983 case law."' I am not sure
what "help"-beyond the original metaphor of the "central" and
the "marginal"-has been provided, except perhaps a new, more
obscure metaphor: arguments are pods containing the "seeds" of
their opposing arguments.
One last chance at illumination is provided by Michel
Foucault, who thankfully "both criticizes and transcends"
Derrida 6 "Foucault maintains that at any point in history there
exists a set of power relationships that establish the conditions of
discourse. ' Following Foucault's lead, Nahmod poses but does
not answer "significant questions regarding the legitimacy of discourse: who owns it and how is it controlled?""8 A hint is presumably implied in Foucault's attempt to show that "every rule or
norm is arbitrary,"59 but Nahmod does not pursue the point; he
51.
52.
53.

Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1734 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1735.
IdL

54. Ild.
55.
56.
57.
Michel

Id. at 1736.
I&
Id. at 1737. Nahmod's support for this proposition comes from Hayden White,
Foucault, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE, supra note 50, at 81; the reader is

advised by Nahmod to "see also" an interview with Foucault.
58.

Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1738.

59. 1& Nahmod's support for this proposition comes from White, supra note 57, at

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:840

observes merely that Foucault's strategy "is wedded to an activist
ideal of change, but there is nothing coherent about it beyond
that."' Yet even in the face of this apparently bleak diagnosis,
Nahmod remains serenely undeterred:
[I]t is not necessary to accept Foucault's nihilism to recognize the
power of his approach to the nature of discourse. As applied to
the move from constitutional rhetoric to tort rhetoric in the
Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence, Foucault's approach suggests at61 the very least that an event of deep significance has occurred.

On this happy and suitably portentous note, the section on "Language and Discourse" ends.
The reader seeking a more tangible "application" of these
rather exotic European philosophers' theories to normal legal
'problems will be disappointed by Nahmod's third and final section,
"The Implications of Tort Rhetoric."'6 2 Nietzsche has spurlos
verschwunden; Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault have disappeared
sans laisser de traces. Neither their ideas nor even their names are
mentioned again-implicitly or explicitly-in the remainder of the
article.63 Instead, Nahmod returns to the exact same sort of narrowly "legal" style and standard doctrinal analysis that characterized his first section.
But this about-face should not really be surprising. The "citation" of philosophers and their nonlegal theories is primarily an attempt to import greater intellectual authority to an area of law
that seems to lack or need it. It is not an attempt to engage these
philosophical theories on their own terms or according to the
nonlegal canons of discussion and professional criteria proper to
them. And given the irreducibly "institutional" structure of authority in law, where intellectual capital has never been the coin of the
realm anyway, the attempt is doubly misguided.'
I do not deny that the startling propositions I have plucked
from Nahmod's article might yet be integrated into an intelligible

99.
60. Nahmod, supra note 37, at 1738.

61. Id.(emphasis added).
62. Id.at 1738-50.
63. The only possible exceptions to this are three mentions of the words "marginal"
and "marginalize" (a term of Derrida's). ld.at 1738, 1742, 1750.

64. See supra text accompanying notes 20-36.
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and intellectually defensible theory of "language and discourse,"

which might conceivably be usefully applied to legal discourse. I
deny only that Nahmod has accomplished, or even seriously at-

tempted, either task.' In any event, such a project would necessarily look very different from the one examined here.6

The desire to enliven an area of law that might otherwise
seem pedestrian is understandable. In our unsettled scholarly

world, where no accepted paradigm guides "normal" legal research, an undeniable "anxiety of influence" accompanies the legal
scholar's poignant realization that credit is no longer given for the
elaboration of the obvious or for modest "doctrinal tinkering" in
the nineteenth-century style.67 It hardly seems fair, when creative

scholars in other disciplines are exploring such interesting and
intellectually exciting new theories, that these cannot somehow be
used in a legal context too. "The trouble is, as so often in philoso-

phy, it6 is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement." 8

65. Furthermore, I am not at all convinced that Nahmod needs "grand theory" to
explain the transformations in legal doctrine that he describes. In addition to the (perhaps all too obvious) explanations suggested supra at note 43 and accompanying text,
compare LEvi, supra note 24, at 6:
It is true that similarity is seen in terms of a word, and inability to find a
ready word to express similarity or difference may prevent change in the law.
The words which have been found in the past are much spoken of, have acquired a dignity of their own, and to a considerable measure control results. As
Judge Cardozo suggested in speaking of metaphors, the word starts out to free
thought and ends by enslaving it.
66. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424
(1992) (applying realist semantics to philosophy of law).
67. See Allen, supra note 17, at 192-94 (bemoaning "the pursuit of the elegant generalization" and "[t]he languishing of knowledge-based scholarship"); Collier, supra note 9,
at 202-03, 271-73; cf. Gerald Graff, Point of View, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 21,
1992, at A56:
[Ilf today's academy is over-anything, it is overgeneralized rather than overspecialized, reserving its greatest rewards for scholars who make large, sweeping
theoretical and interdisciplinary claims. As a result, excessive pressure falls on
younger scholars to produce the Big Synthesis before they may be ready to do
so, while worthy but modestly defined topics go unappreciated.
See generally GERALD GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS (1992).
68. DONALD DAVIDSON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES
INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183, 183 (1984).

